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NOTES
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
Preserving the Traditional Copyright
Balance
Christine Jeanneret*
INTRODUCTION
Technological developments have routinely been regarded warily
by the entertainment industries because of the increased risk of
piracy perceived as accompanying such developments.1 Jack
Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America
(hereinafter “MPAA”), perhaps best illustrated this point with his
comment before the House Judiciary Committee in 1982.2 Valenti
stated that the videocassette recorder “is to the American film
producer and the American public as the Boston Strangler is to the
woman alone.”3
Of course, as noted in the New York Times, “the woman in this
instance survived, and even flourished.”4 The VCR did not spell
doom for the film studios; rather, it provided the film industry with a
new market to exploit through videotape sales and rentals.5
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., cum laude, Barnard
College, 1996. I would like to thank Professor Hugh Hansen for his insights and guidance
in writing this Note, and the editors and staff of the IPLJ for their edits. Special thanks to
my friends, and of course, to Marc and Sharon Jeanneret for all of their invaluable support.
1
See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(discussing the advent of the video cassette recorder and the effects the new technology
would have on copyright owners); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1 (1908) (discussing ramifications of the introduction of the player piano).
2
Adam Liptak, Is Litigation the Best Way to Tame New Technology?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2000, at B9.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See id.
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Despite this success, the potential opportunities created by new
technological innovations are invariably met by the copyright
owners’ instinctual fear of infringement.6 This pervasive fear has
resurfaced once again with the advent of digital technology.7 But is
the fear again unfounded? Digital technology arguably introduces
new and unprecedented threats of piracy.8 Digitally stored works
can be repeatedly reproduced with each copy retaining near perfect
quality.9 The Internet provides an instantly accessible and vast
global audience for digitally pirated works.10
Furthermore,
advancements in file compression programs guarantee faster and
easier transmission of digital works in the future.11 The analog world
presents no such dangers.12
In response to the unique aspects of the digital environment,
Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(hereinafter “DMCA”).13 Indeed, the DMCA was designed “to make
6

See generally Sony, 464 U.S. 417; White-Smith, 209 U.S. 1 (illustrating how these
fears have led to litigation).
7
See infra note 8.
8
See Intellectual Property Rights: The Music and the Film Industry: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Int’l Economic Policy and Trade of the House Int’l Relations Comm.,
105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks) [hereinafter Lehman Statement] (“[a]dvances in
digital technology and the rapid development of electronic networks and other
communications technologies raise the stakes much higher. Any two-dimensional work can
be ‘digitized’ . . . [t]he work can then be stored and used in that digital format. This
dramatically increases: the ease and speed with which it can be copied; the quality of copies
(both the first and the hundredth); the ability to manipulate and change the work; and the
speed with which copies of it—both authorized and unauthorized—can be ‘delivered’ to the
public.”).
9
Id.
10
See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 53-54 n.80 (2000) (describing
characteristics of digital technology such as “ease of transmission and multiple use,” which
allows a single pirate copy to be “hooked up to a network of computers or a network of
users . . . each of whom can have ready and virtually simultaneous use of the same copy”
(citing Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Property
Law, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323 (1990))).
11
See id. (“By comparison with books and other traditional media, works in digital
media do not take up much space. . . . The compactness of digital data will . . . allow new
assemblages of materials that in a print world would be unthinkable.”).
12
See supra notes 7-10; see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
13
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (Supp. IV 1998)).

FIN.JEANNERET

1/18/02 12:18 PM

2001] PRESERVING THE TRADITIONAL COPYRIGHT BALANCE

159

digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted
materials.”14 In order to accomplish its stated goal, the DMCA
incorporated provisions to “provide . . .protection against
circumvention of technological measures used by copyright owners
to protect their works.”15 Thus, the DMCA prohibits circumventing
technological measures in order to merely access, not just copy,
digital copyrighted works.16
Because the DMCA limits access in this way, it has been criticized
as unjustly expanding the monopoly of copyright owners and the
control they can exert over their work.17 Generally, the rights of the
copyright owner include control over the reproduction, distribution,
performance and display of the copyrighted work.18 In barring
access, Congress has been criticized as having, in practical terms,
extended copyright law to also cover “use,” an area historically
considered beyond the scope of the copyright owner’s authority.19
Likewise, critics have argued that by prohibiting technological
circumvention to access a digital work, Congress has effectively
extinguished the defense of fair use.20
This Note takes the position that the anti-circumvention provisions
were a necessary response to the unique threats posed by digital
innovations. Moreover, these provisions were necessary to maintain
an equitable balance between the rights of copyright owners and the
rights of consumers. The realities of file sharing and the recent,

14
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998), as quoted in David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 681 (2000).
15
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY,
Dec. 1998, at 3 [hereinafter SUMMARY].
16
17 U.S.C. § 1201.
17
See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between
access and use in digital environment and perceived threat of a “pay per view” world).
18
See infra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing exclusive rights granted to
copyright owner).
19
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium”, 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 143 (1999).
20
See generally infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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well-publicized flurry of litigation concerning this issue21 only
underscore the necessity of the new legislation.
Part I of this Note will provide a legal background for the
copyright issues explored by discussing the general rights of the
copyright owner—and the limits on these rights—primarily through
the concept of fair use. In addition, Part I introduces the relevant
provisions of the DMCA in more detail. Part II examines both sides
of the conflict surrounding the anti-circumvention provisions by
exploring both the congressional and scholarly debate regarding its
enactment, and by examining the case Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes.22 Part III argues that the threats of a “pay-per-use”
world23 are largely speculative, and that extending the concept of fair
use beyond the statutory exceptions would defeat the purpose of the
DMCA protections and render them useless.

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”24 To this end, Section 106 of
21

See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(holding balance of harms supported grant of preliminary injunction in music industry
plaintiff’s copyright infringement action against Internet start-up which allowed users to
download MP3 music files due to evidence of massive, unauthorized downloading and
uploading of plaintiff’s copyrighted works); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding defendant’s links to
websites providing formulae to de-encrypt plaintiff film industry’s DVD’s constituted
violation of DCMA and warranted granting of preliminary injunction).
22
111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
23
See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 673, 710-39 (2000) (discussing threat of “pay-per-use world”—in which one
would always need to pay for access in an exclusively digital environment).
24
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

FIN.JEANNERET

1/18/02 12:18 PM

2001] PRESERVING THE TRADITIONAL COPYRIGHT BALANCE

161

the Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter “the Act”)25 provides the
copyright owner with the “exclusive rights to do and to authorize”
the reproduction, distribution, and performance or display of the
copyrighted work. 26
Providing the copyright owner with these exclusive rights benefits
both the owner and the general public because “[p]rotection of works
of authorship provides the stimulus for creativity, thus leading to the
availability of works of literature, culture, art and entertainment that
the public desires.”27 Therefore, “[i]f these works are not protected,
then the marketplace will not support their creation and
dissemination, and the public will not receive the benefit of their
existence.”28
However, the “exclusive” rights of the copyright owner are still
subject to certain exceptions,29 including, notably, the defense of fair
use.30 “Fair use” encompasses use “for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”31
The defense “permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of
the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster.”32
Section 107 of the Act delineates four non-exclusive factors to
consider in determining whether a use is “fair.” The factors to be
evaluated include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
25

See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803).
Id. § 106.
27
Information Infrastructure Task Force, The Report of the Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights, Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure: The White Paper (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter White Paper], reprinted in CRAIG
JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW (5th ed. Supp. 2000) at 748.
28
Id.
29
See id. at 759 n.559 (stating that the exclusive right is subject to § 108).
30
17 U.S.C. § 107.
31
Id.
32
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
26
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.33
It is well established that these factors must be weighed together
and applied judicially on a case-by-case basis.34 No single factor is
determinative.35
However, the Supreme Court, in Campbell,
indicated that the fourth factor—the effect upon the potential
market—is the most influential.36
B. Background to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The purpose of the DMCA was to bring U.S. copyright law
“squarely into the digital age.”37 The world was making a steady
transition from an analog to a digital environment due largely to the
rapid growth and use of computer technology—in particular
digitization.38 Coupled with the advances in communications
technology resulting from the development of the fiber optic cable,
the new information infrastructure promised that separate
communications networks would be “integrate[d] . . . into an
advanced high-speed, interactive, broadband, digital communications
system.”39
New methods for reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted
works followed the shift to a digitally based economy.40 With these
new methods and opportunities came new risks.41 As noted in the
Clinton Administration’s “White Paper” on Intellectual Property:

33

17 U.S.C. § 107.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
35
See id. at 578.
36
See id at 590.
37
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998), as quoted in Nimmer, supra note 23, at 680 (2000).
38
See White Paper, supra note 27, at 744.
39
Id.
40
Id. (discussing what these new methods are).
41
See generally supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (illustrating how technological
developments can lead to increased risks).
34
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[T]he NII [National Information Infrastructure] can
provide benefits to authors and consumers by reducing the
time between creation and dissemination . . . [however]
[j]ust one unauthorized uploading of a work onto a
bulletin board, for instance—unlike, perhaps, most single
reproductions and distributions in the analog or print
environment could have devastating effects on the market
for the work.42
The DMCA was enacted to help eliminate these new risks posed
by the digital environment.43 Indeed, the DMCA was considered a
necessary measure to ensure that copyright owners would take
advantage of the new technology and disseminate their works to the
public without having to fear the increased risks of digital piracy.44
C. The DMCA and the Anti-Circumvention Provisions
A key part of realizing the goals necessary to make the digital
world “safe” for copyright owners came in the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA.45 These provisions came as a response to
both the digital age and the international norms set forth in the World
International Property Organization (hereinafter “WIPO”) treaty.46
The Clinton Administration viewed the implementation of the new
legislation as necessary in bringing the U.S. into compliance with the
WIPO treaty’s anti-circumvention norm.47 The WIPO treaty’s anticircumvention clause states:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of
effective technological measures that are used by authors
42

See White Paper supra note 27, at 745-46.
See Lehman Statement, supra note 8.
44
See Lehman Statement, supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the increased
risks of piracy associated with the digital format).
45
See infra notes 53-55 (setting forth the § 1201 anti-circumvention provisions).
46
See Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1705, 1717-18 (1999).
47
See id.
43
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in connection with the exercise of their rights . . . and that
restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not
authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by
law.48
It becomes evident, upon examining the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA, that the language of the WIPO treaty
provision is clearly broader and more general than that used in its
U.S. domestic counterpart. 49
In enacting the DMCA, Congress heeded the advice set forth in the
Administration’s White Paper, which stated that “technological
protection likely will not be effective unless the law also provides
some protection for the technological processes and systems used to
prevent or restrict unauthorized uses of copyrighted works.”50 To
this end, the White Paper recommended that a chapter be included in
the DMCA that would specify the prohibition of:
the importation, manufacture or distribution of any device,
product or component incorporated into a device or
product, or the provision of any service, the primary
purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without authority of
the copyright owner or the law, any process, treatment,
mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the
violation of any of the exclusive rights under Section
106.51
The White Paper’s recommendation was realized in the enactment of
§ 1201.52
Section 1201 broke the anti-circumvention violations down into
three different types of violations: a basic provision,53 a ban on
48

World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, art. 11, 36
I.L.M. 65, 71.
49
See supra note 48; see infra notes 53-55.
50
White Paper, supra note 27, at 744.
51
Id.
52
See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
53
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (“No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
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trafficking,54 and additional violations.55 The basic provision bars an
individual from circumventing a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a copyrighted work.56 “Circumventing
a technological work” is defined in the DMCA as encompassing
actions as varied as de-scrambling, decrypting, or otherwise
avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or impairing a
technological measure, without authorization from the copyright
owner, to gain access to the protected work.57
Section 1201 further defines a technological measure which
effectively controls access to a work as a measure which requires the
application of certain information, or a process or treatment, with the
authority of the copyright owner, in order to gain access to the
work.58
Both the ban on trafficking and the additional violations provision
of § 1201 begin by providing that: “[n]o person shall manufacture,
import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any

effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”).
54
Id. § 1201(a)(2) (“No person shall manufacturer, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that— ‘(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
‘(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or
‘(C) Is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that
person’s knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title.”).
55
Id. § 1201(b)(1) (“No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that – (A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner
under this title in a work or a portion thereof; (B) has only limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof; or (C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person’s knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a
portion thereof.”).
56
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
57
Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
58
Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
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technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof”59
that falls into one of three main categories: (1) is primarily designed
or produced to circumvent; (2) has only limited commercially
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent; (3) is marketed
for use in circumventing.60
The difference between the ban on trafficking and the additional
violations provision is that the ban on trafficking applies to
circumventing a technological measure that controls access to a
work,61 while the additional violations provision applies to
circumventing protection of a technological measure that protects a
right of a copyright owner.62 Namely, § 1201 divides technological
measures into two categories: “those that bar unauthorized access to
a copyright-protected work and those that bar unauthorized copying
of a protected work.”63
Moreover, as noted by Nimmer, “the additional violations appear
in their own statutory paragraph [§ 1201(b)], separate from the
preceding paragraph of section 1201[(a)] that contains both the basic
provision and the ban on trafficking . . . [a]ccordingly, there is a
marked contrast between the two schemes.”64 As Nimmer set forth:
As to prohibited access, the person engaging in that
conduct has violated the basic provision; anyone assisting
her through publicly offering services, products,
devices . . . to achieve the prohibited technological breach
is separately culpable under the ban on trafficking. By
contrast, a person who engaged in prohibited usage of a
work to which he has lawful access does not run afoul of
any provision of section 1201. It is only someone who
assists him through publicly offering services, products,

59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. § 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1).
SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
Id. § 1201(b).
SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4.
Nimmer, supra note 23, at 689.
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devices, etc., to achieve the prohibited technological
breach who becomes culpable under the additional
violations.65
The Copyright Office contends that this “distinction was employed
to assure the public will have the continued ability to make fair use
of copyrighted works.”66 However, the question remains how one
could make fair use of a work when it is illegal to gain access to it.
D. Statutory Exceptions within Section 1201
The anti-circumvention provisions are subject to an ongoing
administrative rule-making process67 to determine whether the
impact of the anti-circumvention provisions is adversely affecting
individuals seeking to make non-infringing uses of copyrighted
works.68 Moreover, section § 1201 is subject to a number of listed
exceptions.69 Perhaps the most significant with regard to fair use is
section § 1201(d), which provides an exemption for the nonprofit
library, archive and educational institution, establishing the so-called
“shopping right.”70 The shopping right permits such nonprofit and
65

Id. at 689-90.
SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4.
67
Id. at 5 (“[P]eriodic rulemaking by the Librarian of Congress, on the recommendation
of the Register of Copyrights, who is to consult with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Communications and Information.”); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (The factors to be
considered in determining the adverse effect of § 1201 include the following: “(i) the
availability for use of copyrighted works; (ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit
archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) the impact that the prohibition on the
circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) the effect of
circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works;
and (v) such other factors as the Librarian [of Congress] deems appropriate.”).
68
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). See also supra note 67 and accompanying text
(describing factors involved in making a determination of whether there has been an adverse
effect).
69
17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(j).
70
Id. § 1201(d) (“Exemption for nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational
institutions. — (1) A nonprofit, library, archives, or educational institution which gains
access to a commercially exploited copyrighted work solely in order to make a good faith
determination of whether to acquire a copy of that work for the sole purpose of engaging in
66
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educational or archival institutions to circumvent solely for the
purpose of making a good-faith determination regarding whether
they wish to obtain authorized access to the work.71 However, this
exemption exists only when “an identical copy of that work is not
reasonably available in another form.”72 Other important exemptions
listed in § 1201 include reverse engineering to achieve
interoperability,73 encryption research,74 protecting personal
privacy,75 and security testing.76
In addition, § 1201 includes a general savings clause which
provides that “[n]othing in this section should affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title.”77 However, it is important to interpret the anticircumvention provisions in § 1201 as constituting a violation
separate and distinct from copyright infringement.78 Thus, fair use,
the traditional defense to copyright infringement, does not apply to
technological circumvention.79 Indeed, a violation of the anticonduct permitted under this title shall not be in violation of subsection (a)(1)(A).”).
71
Id.
72
Id. § 1201(d)(2).
73
Id. § 1201(f) (exception which permits circumvention by “a person who has lawfully
obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program for the sole
purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to
achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program with other
programs. . . .”).
74
Id. § 1201(g) (permits circumvention of access control measures to identify flaws in
encryption technologies).
75
Id. § 1201(i) (permits circumvention when the technological measure, or the work it
protects, is capable of collecting or disseminating personally identifying information about
the online activities of a person).
76
Id. § 1201(j) (permits circumvention for the purpose of testing the security of a
computer system or network).
77
Id. § 1201(c)(1).
78
See id.
79
See The On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act and the WIPO Copyright
Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Mary Beth Peters, Register of Copyrights, discussing the
inapplicability of fair use to the act of circumvention) [hereinafter Peters Statement]; see
also id. (“[T]he [savings] clause does not establish fair use as a defense to the violation of
section 1201 in itself . . . the fair use provision in section 107 by its terms applies only to
infringement of copyright rights.”).
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circumvention provisions is deemed a violation regardless of whether
it even results in infringement.80
II. FAIR USE: STRIKING A BALANCE WITH THE DMCA
This part presents the arguments set forth by critics of the DMCA,
as well as the arguments made in favor of the perceived “greater”
protection afforded by the DMCA.81 In addition, this section will
examine how the Southern District of New York interpreted § 1201
in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes.82
A. Section 1201 as an Improper Expansion of the Copyright
Monopoly
1. Section 1201 is Unnecessarily Broad
In enacting the DMCA, Congress is charged with pandering to
Hollywood and the demands of the copyright industry giants.83 The
stated goals of the DMCA, namely, to bring the U.S. into compliance
with the WIPO treaty and to bring U.S. copyright law “squarely into
the digital age,”84 arguably did not require measures as stringent as
those reflected in the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions.85 The
anti-circumvention provisions drafted into the DMCA certainly
80

See id.
See infra Part II.A-B.
82
111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
83
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the AntiCircumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 523 (1999)
(“[B]y colorful use of high rhetoric and forceful lobbying, Hollywood and its allies were
successful in persuading Congress to adopt the broad anti-circumvention legislation they
favored. . . .”).
84
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
85
See Samuelson, supra note 83, at 563 (arguing that the stringent measures seen in
section 1201 comes as the result of bad judgment on the part of the Clinton Administration
and not from any flaws in the WIPO Treaty, Samuelson maintains that the “diplomatic
conference had the good sense to adopt only a general norm on circumvention, leaving
nations free to implement this norm in their own way.”); see also supra note 48 and
accompanying text (setting forth the corresponding WIPO provision).
81

FIN.JEANNERET

170

1/18/02 12:18 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.12:157

exceeded the corresponding provision in the WIPO treaty.86 In fact,
according to Secretary William Daley of the Department of
Commerce, “[F]or the most part the [WIPO] treaties largely
incorporate intellectual property norms that are already part of U.S.
law.”87 Indeed, “[t]he U.S. could have pointed to a number of
statutes and judicial decisions that establish anti-circumvention
norms.”88 In addition, “[w]ith U.S. copyright industries thriving in
the current legal environment, it would have been fair to conclude
that copyright owners were adequately protected by the law.”89
The copyright industries, however, demanded that the DMCA
provide them with stronger protection,90 a request that was
considered premature by some critics.91 Even if new legislation was
in fact necessary, Pamela Samuelson argues that the anticircumvention provisions that were enacted go far beyond what was
required to make the world safe for copyrighted works in the digital
era: “the Administration might have . . . proposed to make it illegal
to circumvent a technical protection system for purposes of engaging
in or enabling copyright infringement. This, after all, was the danger

86

See The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and The World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Hearings on
H.R. 2180 and 2281 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement from the Digital Future Coalition arguing that “[i]t is . . . the opinion of many
experts that enactment of adequate and effective measures against special purpose ‘black
boxes’ would, in itself, be sufficient to satisfy a contracting nation’s obligations in this
regard.”).
87
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 6 (1998).
88
Samuelson, supra note 83, at 532.
89
Id.
90
See The On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act and the WIPO Copyright
Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America,
extolling the virtues of the copyright industries and their importance to the national
economy in producing more than $50 billion of revenue abroad, providing roughly four
percent of the GDP, and employing people at twice the rate of the national average).
91
See Intellectual Property: Hearings on H.R. 2281 Before the Telecommunications,
Trade and Consumer Protection Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong.
(1998) (statement of Hilary Rosen, President and C.E.O., the Recording Industry
Association of America) [hereinafter Rosen Statement].
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that was said to give rise to the call for anti-circumvention
regulations in the first place.”92
In contrast, the DMCA makes it illegal not just to infringe upon a
copyrighted work, but also to circumvent a technological measure in
order to gain access.93 In fact, the device or service which
circumvents the measure need not be designed or produced to do
so.94 The DMCA prohibits any device that has only “limited
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent.”95
A potential plaintiff need only demonstrate that the device is capable
of circumvention; hence, there is no need to prove even one instance
of actual infringement.96 The legislation is thus regarded as extreme
because it punishes the circumvention devices themselves, rather
than the individual bad acts.97
B. Section 1201 Contradicts the Sony Decision and Extinguishes
Fair Use
Opponents of § 1201 have further questioned how the DMCA
squares with the seminal decision regarding fair use reached in Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios.98 In Sony, the Supreme Court
explored the effect of home videotape recorders on the rights of
copyright owners.99 Respondents (copyright owners) filed suit
against petitioners (VCR manufacturers) alleging that some
individuals had used petitioners’ VCR’s to record respondents’
copyrighted programs which had been exhibited on commercially
sponsored television.100 As a result, respondents asserted that their
92

Samuelson, supra note 83, at 533.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
94
Id. § 1201(a)(2)(B).
95
Id.
96
See Samuelson, supra note 83, at 556 (“[t]his creates a potential for ‘strike suits’ by
nervous or opportunistic copyright owners who might challenge (or threaten to challenge)
the deployment of a new information technology tool whose capabilities may include
circumvention of some technical protection system . . . [t]he mere potentiality for
infringement will suffice to confer rich rewards on a successful plaintiff.”).
97
See id.
98
464 U.S. 417 (1984). See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
99
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428-34 (1984).
100
Id. at 419-20 (respondents own copyrights on some television programs broadcast on
93
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copyrights had been infringed.101 Respondents further asserted that
by marketing the VCR’s to the public, petitioners’ were liable for the
alleged infringement.102
In its 5-4 decision103 the Court ultimately held that “time-shifting,”
defined as the recording of a television broadcast to be watched at a
later time, constituted a “substantial non-infringing” use, and was
therefore a fair use.104 In the opinion delivered by Justice Stevens,
the Court held that “the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of
other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of
substantial non-infringing uses.”105 The Court found that one
potential use of the VCR—private, noncommercial time-shifting in
the home—satisfied the substantial non-infringing use standard.106
In order to challenge such a noncommercial use, the Court stated
that the respondent must prove either that such a use would be
harmful or that if the noncommercial use were to become
widespread, “it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work.”107 The Court supported the District Court’s
finding that there was no basis to the assumption that live television
audiences would decrease as a result of Betamax tapes.108 Moreover,
the Court observed that respondents might in fact benefit from the
public’s use of Betamax since it might allow more people to actually
view their broadcasts.109 Thus the Court dismissed respondents’
claim that time-shifting presented any likelihood of harm to the value
of their copyrighted works.110
public airwaves).
101
Id. at 420.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 457 (Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall,
Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined).
104
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
105
Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
106
See id.
107
Id. at 451.
108
See id. at 452-55.
109
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.
110
See id. at 456.
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The Court further noted that copyright protection has never
accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses
of his work.111 Individual consumers still retain the ability to
reproduce a copyrighted work in order to make a fair use.112
The relevance of the decision in Sony was questioned during
congressional hearings on the DMCA.113 Gary Shapiro, President of
Consumer Electronic Manufacturers, argued that “[p]roponents of
section 1201 should simply admit that it nullifies the [Sony] Betamax
holding:
[N]ow, section 1201(b) would ban [the VCR], upon a
finding that it, or any component or part, is designed, used
or marketed for the purpose of failing to respond to any
so-called ‘technical protection’ measure.114
In short, under § 1201, the VCR would be considered a
circumvention device which should be banned from being sold
despite the fact that it also provides a legitimate non-infringing
use.115 When before the House Judiciary Committee, the Digital
Future Coalition echoed the same concern:
[S]pecifically, we have argued that to preserve the
availability of multi-purpose consumer electronic devices
(such as VCR’s and PC’s) it is essential that prohibitions
on technology contained in any new digital intellectual
property legislation should be limited to those devices
which are specifically designed or marketed to defeat
owners’ efforts at technology self-help. The over breadth
of the technology regulations contained in ‘digital
111

See id. at 432-33.
See id. at 433.
113
See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
114
See The On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act and the WIPO Copyright
Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Gary Shapiro, President of Consumer Electronic Manufacturers)
[hereinafter Shapiro Statement].
115
See id.
112
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copyright’ bills introduced in the 104th Congress, prior to
the conclusion of the WIPO treaties, was a principle basis
of DFC’s [Digital Future Coalition’s] opposition to those
proposals.116
Thus, the broadness of the anti-circumvention provisions may limit
the ability of technology companies to create innovative devices,
and, to some degree, will allow the copyright industries to control the
“design and manufacture of all information technologies that can
process digital information.”117
Concerns about the broad language used in the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA are not limited to members of the
technology community.118 An individual creating a circumvention
device solely for the purpose of acquiring access to make a “fair use”
of a digital work—e.g., helping a library circumvent a technological
measure to make use of its “shopping right” in order to determine if
the library might want to acquire a particular digital work—would
also violate the statute.119 The fair use doctrine is not a defense to
the act of circumvention.120 Thus, as Nimmer states in his recent
article, “section 1201 produces a most curious state of affairs. It
safeguards various rights to users but simultaneously bars third
parties from assisting them to take advantage of those safeguarded
rights.”121

116

The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and The World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Hearings on
H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Peter Jaszi, Professor of Law, The American University, representing the
Digital Future Coalition, noting that the Digital Future Coalition represents “43 national
organizations collectively committed to the appropriate application of intellectual property
laws in the emerging networked digital information environment.”) [hereinafter Jaszi
Statement].
117
Samuelson, supra note 83, at 534.
118
See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 143 (prohibiting devices which facilitate access to
copyrighted works, in addition to prohibiting authorized uses of such works, § 1201
arguably limits the general public’s ability to make fair use of copyrighted works).
119
See id.
120
See SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4.
121
See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 733.
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It is well settled that access, in the digital environment, is a
necessary prerequisite to use.122 Thus, it follows that if one cannot
invoke fair use while attempting to access a work in order to use it
for legitimate purposes, then the defense of fair use is pre-empted.123
Within this new framework, the copyright owner now exercises
control over the use, not just the reproduction, distribution, or
performance of the copyrighted work.124 In this way the DMCA
upsets the traditional balance afforded by the 1976 Copyright Act.125
The new balance, it is argued, tilts decidedly toward the desires of
the content providers (i.e., copyright owners) to the detriment of the
public’s ability to access works,126 and also to the detriment of the
information technology sector in advancing new technological
innovations.127
The copyright industries, Pamela Samuelson
concludes, “seem to believe they are so important to America that
they should be allowed to control every facet of what Americans do
with digital information.”128
Legislators grappled with this apparent imbalance while the
DMCA was still working its way through various committees.129
While the bill was under review in the Commerce Committee,
Representative Bliley noted that “copyright law is not just about
protecting information. It’s just as much about affording reasonable
access to it as a means of keeping our democracy healthy.”130 The
Commerce Committee voiced its concern about the proposed legal
framework and its potential to create a “pay-per-use” society.131 “[I]t
would be ironic,” as the consumers’ Union stated in a letter to the
Commerce Committee, “if the great popularization of access to
122

See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 143 (“because ‘access’ is a prerequisite to ‘use,’ by
controlling the former, the copyright owner may well end up preventing or conditioning the
latter.”).
123
See id.
124
See id.
125
See generally id.
126
See Samuelson, supra note 83, at 533-34.
127
See id.
128
Id. at 534.
129
See, e.g., supra notes 91, 114, 116.
130
144 CONG. REC. H7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley), as quoted
in Samuelson, supra note 83, at 542-43.
131
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26 (1998).
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information, which is the promise of the electronic age, will be shortchanged by legislation that purports to promote this promise, but in
reality puts a monopoly stranglehold on information.”132
In contrast to the analog world, if a work is distributed digitally
and a physical copy does not exist, then it is possible to envision a
scenario where in order to even browse a particular work, one would
need to pay for each such use.133 Such a scenario could restrict the
free flow of information and tip the balance in favor of content
providers.134 To avoid such an outcome, the Commerce Committee
included various measures designed to strike a suitable balance
between the goals of advancing electronic commerce and still
protecting intellectual property in a digital setting.135 Among these
measures, the congressional press release on the issue cited the
inclusion of strong fair use provisions, such as the shopping right for
educational and other similarly situated institutions, and the
provisions calling for administrative review of those adversely
affected users.136
As Nimmer notes, however, it is unclear whether § 1201
effectively protects fair use and, for that matter, whether § 1201
successfully prevents the risk of a pay-per-use world.137 Nimmer
illustrates the inadequacy of the user exemption with the following
example:
Sally is to be hired to aid someone [Harry, who lacks the
technical expertise to circumvent himself] who has every
right under section 1201 to circumvent the technological
protections in order to obtain access. It would seem,
132

Id.
See Jennifer Burke Sylva, Digital Delivery & Distribution of Music & Other Media:
Recent Trends in Copyright Law; Relevant Technologies; and Emerging Business Models,
20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 217, 228-29 (2000) (discussing risk that only people who pay
will benefit from creative works if access is limited by means of “technological gates and
digital envelopes.”).
134
See id.
135
See Congressional Press Release, Tom Bliley, House Approves Commerce
Committee Bill Protecting Consumer (Aug. 4, 1998).
136
See id.
137
Nimmer, supra note 23, at 726.
133
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therefore, that her conduct should not only be exempt
under the statute, but that it should be positively
applauded—for it is necessary to vindicate the statute’s
policies, with respect to all but the most technically
sophisticated users of copyrighted materials. Nonetheless,
the statute as drafted bars Sally from aiding Harry because
the user exemption applies solely to the basic provision
and not to the coordinate trafficking ban.138
Therefore, though Sally would only be circumventing in
order to aid Harry, an individual who will make a
legitimate “fair use” of the work, she would still be
culpable under the DMCA.139 Technically, by helping
Harry, Sally is “providing her services,” which arguably:
(1) are primarily designed for the purpose of
circumventing; or, (2) have only limited commercial
significance, purpose, or use other than to circumvent a
technological measure; or (3) are marketed by or in
concert with that person with his or her knowledge for use
in circumventing a technological measure.140 Short of
developing the technical expertise on his own, Harry
requires the services of another to gain access;
nevertheless, these services are defined in the statute as
trafficking.141 Because the user exemption only applies to
the basic provision and not the ban on trafficking, Harry
may not legally gain access.142 As a result, “the reach of
the trafficking ban is unjustifiably broad; Congress should
have reconciled the trafficking ban with the exemptions
that it placed on the basic provision.”143

138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 735-36.
Id.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 735-37.
Nimmer, supra note 23, at 735-37.
Id. at 737.
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B. Section 1201: A Necessary Enhancement of Copyright Protection
for the Digital Age
1. Is Section 1201 Too Broad?
In enacting the DMCA, Congress was well aware that it had to
strike a balance between fair use and the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA controlling access to copyrighted works.144
In the end, the prevalent view in Congress reflected that of the White
Paper, asserting that stronger protection was necessary in order for
copyright holders to be able to exploit their works digitally.145
Without these stronger protections, the risk of piracy would
overshadow the benefits of entering the digital market for copyright
owners.146
The digital age, and the new threat of piracy which accompanies
it,147 demands a new legal framework in order to preserve the
traditional rights of copyright owners.148 Far from expanding the
monopoly of exclusive rights held by content owners, the DMCA
ensures only that copyright owners retain their preexisting rights.149
The digital world is so different from the analog world that imposing
meaningful protection requires a readjusting of the copyright
balance.150 Indeed, the new digital environment requires that
“[m]eaningful protection for copyrighted works . . . proceeds [sic] on
two fronts: the property rights themselves, supplemented by legal
assurances that those rights can be technologically safeguarded.”151
The Copyright Office has refuted the idea that § 1201 should cover
144

See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
146
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (discussing the need for new legislation “[d]ue to
the ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually
instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the
Internet without reasonable assurances that they will be protected against massive piracy.”).
147
See supra notes 8, 146 and accompanying text.
148
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
149
See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
150
See Peters Statement, supra note 79 (discussing the inadequacy of previous legal
protection in dealing with new technologies).
151
Id.
145
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only bad acts, i.e., infringement, as opposed to extending it to the
marketing and/or distribution of devices capable of circumvention.152
Such an interpretation has been rejected by the Copyright Office as
inadequate because of the “difficulty involved in discovering and
obtaining meaningful relief from individuals who engage in acts of
circumvention.”153 Therefore, a more expansive prohibition that
reaches the individuals providing the means for circumvention is
“necessary to make the protection adequate and effective.”154 The
Register of Copyrights has further noted that “the conduct of
commercial suppliers is what actually enables and ultimately results
in large-scale circumvention.”155
Certain critics, such as the Digital Future Coalition, suggest that §
1201 be amended to make the standard for a violation conjunctive, as
opposed to disjunctive.156 According to this view, the three possible
ways in which one could violate § 1201 should be strung together so
that one must do all three: (1) the device must have been primarily
designed or produced to circumvent; and (2) the device must have
only a limited commercially significant purpose; and (3) the device
must be marketed for use in circumventing—in order to violate the
statute.157 However, as discussed below, requiring the violation of
all three categories would greatly reduce the effectiveness of § 1201
as it now stands.158
The alleged “broadness” of § 1201 is a necessary reaction to the
manner in which circumvention devices may end up on the market.
As Hillary Rosen from the Recording Industry Association of
America (hereinafter “RIAA”) explained during her statement before
the House Commerce Committee, such a construct of § 1201
“assumes a singular chain of command in the way products are
placed in the marketplace.”159 However, since there is no single
152

Id.
Id.
154
Id.
155
See Peters Statement, supra note 79 (discussing the inadequacy of previous legal
protection in dealing with new technologies).
156
See Jaszi Statement, supra note 116.
157
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
158
See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
159
Rosen Statement, supra note 91.
153
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chain of command, § 1201 had to be drafted as a disjunctive test to
have the desired effect on the different players along the distribution
chain.160 The first proscribed category—that of primarily designing
a circumvention device—speaks to the manufacturers of the
technology.161 The second proscribed category—banning devices
that have only a limited commercially significant purpose other than
circumvention—is a catch-all intended to weed out otherwise useless
products that end up causing harm.162 The third, and final,
proscribed category—that of marketing a circumvention product—
speaks to the retailers and distributors.163 If the statute required that
all three elements be combined, the standard would be “effectively
impossible to meet and [would be] a road map for pirates.”164
The purpose of these proscriptions is to keep circumvention
devices off the market.165 As Jane Ginsburg noted in a recent article:
“[b]y outlawing the general distribution of post-access circumvention
devices, Congress has . . . adjusted the technological status quo in
favor of copyright owners, and, at least for now, set the copyright
‘balance’ against unauthorized convenience copying.”166 In the
analog world, copyrighted works were “not amenable to effective
copy protection” and thus “convenience copying” was tolerated to
some extent.167 In the digital world, however, the dangers of such
“convenience copying” are immeasurably direr for the copyright
owners,168 thus warranting legal protection for the actual
technological protection given to digital copyrighted works.169
Indeed, “if in the past low technology imposed a tolerance for
widespread copying, this state of affairs should not be confused with

160

Id.
Id.; 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(2)(A).
162
Rosen Statement, supra note 91.
163
Id.; 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(2)(C).
164
Rosen Statement, supra note 91.
165
See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 144.
166
Id. at 155.
167
Id. at 154.
168
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why piracy is a much
greater threat in the digital era).
169
See id.
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a legal right to engage in widespread convenience copying.”170
Accordingly, as § 1201(a)(2) sets forth, devices which enable such
convenience copying must effectively be kept off the market.171 In
this way, the proscriptions of § 1201(a) are not overly broad, but in
fact are well tailored to respond to the new threats posed by the
digital environment.
2. Section 1201 Does Not Disturb Fair Use
Proponents of the DMCA have rebutted the claim that § 1201 does
not preserve the defense of fair use.172 The Copyright Office clearly
set out in its summary of the new legislation that the distinction
between the prohibitions against access and the prohibitions against
infringement were specifically adopted to preserve fair use.173
Therefore, an individual cannot cry fair use to escape liability and
thus emasculate the anti-circumvention provisions when he or she
has unlawfully obtained access; fair use applies only with lawful
access.174 Supporters of the DMCA provisions argue that lawful
access has always been a prerequisite to fair use, thus the anticircumvention provisions do not truly constitute a change in the
manner in which fair use is invoked.175
Furthermore, proponents of § 1201 assert that the balance has not
shifted since “it has long been accepted in U.S. law that the copyright
owner has the right to control access to his work, and may choose not
to make it available to others or to do so on only set terms.”176 This
principle is illustrated by a myriad of real-life examples, including
situations in which a copyright owner may choose to never publish a
work, or when a movie theater or museum charges admission and
bans the recording (be they audio, video, or photographic recordings)

170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 154.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
See, e.g., Peters Statement, supra note 79.
SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4.
See id.; see also Peters Statement, supra note 79.
Peters Statement, supra note 79.
Id.
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of the works presented.177 Thus the copyright owner traditionally
has both controlled and conditioned the access of copyrighted works
afforded to the public, with users generally paying for access.178 The
Administration’s White Paper noted that “the fair use doctrine does
not require a copyright owner to allow or to facilitate unauthorized
access or use of a work.”179 If this were the case, then “even
passwords for access to computer databases would be considered
illegal.”180
The anti-circumvention provisions embodied in § 1201 simply
continue this practice, and have been analogized to a law against
breaking and entering: “Under existing law, it is not permissible to
break into a locked room in order to make fair use of a manuscript
kept inside.”181 Similarly, one cannot circumvent technological
protections without authorization in order to make a fair use of a
digital work.182
Not only does § 1201 preserve fair use, but its proponents contend
that the standard built into § 1201—namely, that of proscribing
circumvention devices which have only a limited commercially
significant purpose other than to circumvent—in fact builds upon the
“substantial non-infringing” standard set forth in Sony.183 While the
Sony standard in itself is ineffective in addressing the problem of
circumvention,184 the “[standard from section 1201] makes the
[Sony] standard more meaningful.” 185 The Register of Copyrights
further claims that that § 1201 is helpful because it refers:

177

See White Paper, supra note 27, at 762-63.
See Peters Statement, supra note 79.
179
White Paper, supra note 27, at 762-63.
180
Id. at 763.
181
Peters Statement, supra note 79.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
See id. (“[m]ost devices for circumventing technological measures, even those
designed or entirely used for infringing purposes, will be capable of substantial noninfringing uses since they could potentially be employed in the course of a fair use, or in the
use of a public domain work. It is therefore not surprising that the Sony standard, in
practice, has been ineffective in addressing the circumvention problem.”).
185
Id.
178
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to the extent to which the product is actually used for
legitimate purposes, rather than its capability to be used
for such purposes. At the same time, it is consistent with
Sony in that it does not prohibit products with a
substantial non-circumventing use, only those with merely
limited commercially significant non-circumventing
use.186
Thus, in contrast to the arguments set forth by the DMCA’s
critics,187 § 1201 preserves the availability of multi-purpose
consumer electronic devices so long as such products are actually
used for, and are not merely capable of, substantial noncircumventing use.188
C. Case Study: Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA were put to the
test in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes.189 In the early
1990’s, the major film studios explored the possibility of releasing
films to the home market in the form of digital versatile disks
(hereinafter “DVD”).190 Noting the increased threat of piracy that
accompanied the release of films in a digital format, the major film
studios adopted an encryption system (known as “CSS,” a contentscrambling system) to protect each DVD.191 In turn, the motion
picture studios licensed the technology necessary to decrypt the
DVD files to consumer electronic manufacturers.192 The end result

186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 309.
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 310.
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was that DVD’s could be played, but not copied, on licensed players
and computer drives.193
In September 1999, a Norwegian teenager by the name of Jon
Johansen, with the help of two friends, reverse engineered194 a
licensed DVD player and unlocked the key to the CSS encryption
algorithm.195 With this new information, the teenagers created
“DeCSS,” a program enabling non-compliant computers to both play
and copy DVD files to the computer’s hard drive.196 Johansen
posted the DeCSS program on the web, and it quickly became
available on a variety of websites.197
In January 2000, the Motion Picture Association of America
(hereinafter “MPAA”) brought suit against a website known as
2600.com, which both posted the DeCSS program on its site and
provided links to other websites posting the program.198 In February
of 2000, the Southern District of New York issued a preliminary
injunction against the defendants and ordered them to remove the
DeCSS posting from their website.199 The defendants complied, but
still supported links to other websites with DeCSS.200 The MPAA
promptly filed suit against the defendants under the DMCA, alleging
that by providing links to websites with DeCSS, the defendants were
violating § 1201(a)(2) by making available certain technologies
“developed or advertised to defeat technological protections against
unauthorized access to a [copyrighted] work,” in violation of §
1201(a)(2) (banning trafficking).201
In other words, the defendants

193

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (defining “reverse engineering” as “analyzing elements in order
to achieve interoperability with other programs.”).
195
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 312.
199
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against defendants’ posting of the
DeCSS program on their website).
200
See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
201
Id. at 316.
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were continuing to do indirectly what they were enjoined from doing
under the injunction.202
Judge Kaplan cited as the “inescapable facts” of the case the
following: “(1) CSS is a technological means that effectively
controls access to plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, (2) the one and only
function of DeCSS is to circumvent CSS, and (3) defendants offered
and provided DeCSS by posting it on their web site.”203 Moreover,
“[w]hether defendants [posted DeCSS] in order to infringe, or to
permit or encourage others to infringe, copyrighted works in
violation of other provisions of the Copyright Act simply does not
matter for the purposes of section 1201(a)(2).”204
In response to the charges from the MPAA, the defendants raised
the affirmative defense of fair use, arguing that it is improper to
construe § 1201 in a manner which would impede making a fair use
of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, i.e., DVD’s.205 Accordingly, the
defendants asserted that § 1201 did not apply to their activities,
which simply enabled users of DeCSS to make fair uses of plaintiffs’
works.206 In substance, the defendants contended, “the antitrafficking provision leaves those who lack sufficient technical
expertise to circumvent CSS themselves without the means of
acquiring circumvention technology that they need to make fair use
of the content of plaintiffs’ copyrighted DVDs.”207 In addition,
defendants claimed that because DeCSS may be used for the purpose
of gaining access to copyrighted works in order to make a fair use,
DeCSS is capable of a “substantial non-infringing use”208 and is thus
permissible under the holding in Sony.209
Judge Kaplan, in ruling on the issue, stated that “[a] given device
or piece of technology might have a ‘substantial non-infringing use,
202

See id.
Id.
204
Id.
205
See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
206
Id. at 322.
207
Id. at 336.
208
Id. at 323 (quoting RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000
WL 127311, *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (citation omitted)).
209
See supra text accompanying notes 104-06 (discussing holding of Sony).
203
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and hence be immune from attack under Sony’s construction of the
Copyright Act—but nonetheless still be subject to suppression under
section 1201 . . . Congress explicitly noted that section 1201 does not
incorporate Sony.”210 Moreover, as Judge Kaplan observed, fair use
is not a defense to a § 1201(a)(2) violation since the defendants are
not being sued for copyright infringement.211
Furthermore, Judge Kaplan reasoned, those wishing to make a fair
use of plaintiffs’ DVD’s are not precluded from doing so.212 As he
explained, fair use of a motion picture necessarily implicates one of
the following three uses: (1) quoting words from the script; (2)
listening to the soundtrack; and (3) viewing of the actual images.213
He concluded that while “[a]ll three of these types of uses now are
affected by the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA,” they are
affected “only to a trivial degree.”214 First, all films available on
DVD are also available on videotape.215 Second, even assuming that
films will one day only be available digitally, Judge Kaplan asserted
the impact on lawful use would still be limited since “[c]ompliant
DVD players permit one to view or listen to a DVD movie without
circumventing CSS in any prohibited sense. The technology
permitting manufacture of compliant DVD players is available to
anyone on a royalty-free basis and at a modest cost.”216
As Judge Kaplan noted, the anti-circumvention provisions could
significantly impact technology that copies portions of a DVD, since
the design of compliant DVD players prevents copying.217
It is the

210

Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24 (citations omitted).
See id. at 322 (noting that defendants “are sued for offering and providing technology
designed to circumvent technological measures that control access to copyrighted works and
otherwise violating Section 1201(a)(2) of the Act. If Congress had meant the fair use
defense to apply to such actions, it would have said so.”).
212
See id. at 322-23.
213
See id. at 337.
214
Id.
215
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
216
Id.
217
Id.
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rights of these individuals upon whom the defendants most heavily
rely.218 However, there is no evidence that the rights of such third
parties are implicated in the case at hand.219
Stating that “in an age in which the excitement of ready access to
untold quantities of information has blurred in some minds the fact
that taking what is not yours and not freely offered to you is
stealing,”220 the court held that the DMCA weighed in on the side of
the MPAA and accordingly, entitled the film studios to injunctive
and declaratory relief.221
III. DMCA AS A PROPER RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT REALITY
A. Analysis of Reimerdes
Many in the legal community anticipated the decision in
Reimerdes since it represented one of the first cases in which a
federal court would apply the DMCA.222 Reimerdes established
important legal precedent and reframed the debate over fair use.223
In their Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, defendants criticized
Judge Kaplan’s interpretation of the DMCA, arguing that such a
construction would grant copyright owners the power to abolish the
fair use of digital works by furnishing them with control over all
physical means to display or copy those works.224 Defendants
218

See id. at 338.
Id.
220
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
221
Id. at 346 (“In our society . . . clashes of competing interests like this are resolved by
Congress. For now, at least, Congress has resolved this clash in the DMCA and in
plaintiffs’ favor.”).
222
See, e.g., Carl S. Kaplan, Tough Court Fight Expected Over DVD Code, N.Y. TIMES
CYBER LAW JOURNAL, (Feb. 11, 2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
library/tech/00/02/cyber/cyberlaw/11law.html (“[Reimerdes] could well prove to be more
legally significant because it represents one of the first cases in which a federal court will
attempt to interpret the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.”).
223
See supra notes 189-93, 195-98, 200-21 and accompanying text.
224
See Respondents’ Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00-277).
219
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further protested that while DeCSS allows forms of fair uses, such as
brief quoting, excerpting, scientific study, or academic archiving,
plaintiffs’ authorized DVD players deliberately do not permit such
uses.225 The fact that they were not being sued for infringement
should not, according to defendants, allow the court to ignore the
radical effect the DMCA has on the potential fair uses of DeCSS.226
However, the fact that defendants are not being sued for
infringement, but rather for providing an anti-circumvention device,
was precisely the purpose behind the enactment of the DMCA, and
specifically § 1201(a)(2).227 Section 1201(a)(2) creates a new right
for copyright owners by providing them with the right to guard the
technological system which protects copyrighted content in a digital
format.228 As legislative history makes abundantly clear, fair use is
not a defense to a § 1201(a)(2) violation.229 According to Congress,
this “new right” was an appropriate response to the changing digital
environment.230 The fact that § 1201 stands as a distinct violation
from infringement is crucial.231 Otherwise:
the § 1201 anti-trafficking provisions would be
meaningless, because a plaintiff would have to wait until
copyright infringement has occurred to bring an action,
and infringement was already unlawful before the DMCA
was enacted. Congress could not have intended a statute

225

See id.
See id.
227
See id.
228
Trial Transcript at 4, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00-0277) [hereinafter Trial Transcript] (the DMCA “created . . . a
new right that a copyright owner would have if he had to protect the system, a technology
which would protect his copyrighted material. He got the right to that safety device and the
right not to have it circumvented as a matter of federal law. So this is like a guard or a moat
surrounding the house, the protected material.”).
229
See Peters Statement, supra note 79.
230
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
231
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 839-40 (2001).
226
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enacted after such extensive consideration to be
interpreted as mere surplusage [sic] to an already existing
right to sue for copyright infringement.232
Even assuming fair use was an applicable defense, the defendants
in Reimerdes are far from eligible for the exception. As Mary Beth
Peters, the Register of Copyright, stated in her statement before the
House Judiciary Committee, the DMCA builds upon the meaning of
Sony, the seminal case on fair use, by referring to the extent to which
the product (in this case DeCSS) is actually used for lawful purposes,
as opposed to its capability to be used for lawful purposes.233 Thus,
while defendants argue that DeCSS permits certain forms of fair use,
its mere potential to be used for legitimate purposes does not satisfy
the necessary standard.234
There is no evidence that DeCSS has actually been used for such
legitimate purposes. However, it was clear from defendants’ website
that the hyperlinks to other sites with postings of DeCSS were, at the
very least, marketed with the knowledge they could be used to
circumvent technological measures that control access to a protected
work.235 While Jon Johansen may have developed DeCSS with the
legitimate intent of enabling non-compliant computers to play
DVD’s, the defendants in Reimerdes plainly did not market the
device as such.236 Likewise, the DMCA does not allow them to hide
behind the alleged legitimate intent of the manufacturer in defense.237
Instead, Reimerdes illustrates why the anti-circumvention provisions
require disjunctive, as opposed to conjunctive, language to serve
232
Appellants’ Post-Trial Brief at 6, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 111 F. Supp.
2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00-277).
233
Peters Statement, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
234
See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 152 (arguing that allowing a device to be “exculpated
simply because it is capable of being put to fair use . . . [would] as a practical matter [allow]
the fair use tail [to] again wag the copyright infringement dog.”).
235
See Trial Transcript, supra note 228, at 13 (noting that the defendants’ website
stated, “Yes, you can trade DVD movie files over the Internet” and “Notice the DVD Copy
Control Association are cocksuckers.”).
236
Id.
237
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (omitting intent as a prerequisite to determining if an
anti-circumvention measure is in violation of the DMCA).
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their purpose.238 If a violation of § 1201 required that the
circumventing device be primarily designed to circumvent and
possess only a limited commercially significant purpose other than
circumvention and be marketed as a circumvention device, then §
1201 would be riddled with ways by which distributors could avoid
liability. Namely, it would enable one to hide behind what the
device was designed to do, a standard bearing no relationship to how
a device will ultimately be marketed and, most importantly, put to
use. In Reimerdes, the DMCA served its purpose by holding the
defendants accountable for marketing DeCSS as a circumvention
product which would allow individuals to bypass the encryption
system protecting DVD’s.239
B. Analysis of DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions: Is Section
1201 Too Broad?
The DMCA allows copyright owners to control digital
distribution.240 The argument that the DMCA thereby created a new
right for copyright owners, a right to control access to copyrighted
works, is not accurate. While it is true that the DMCA prohibits both
the infringement of a copyrighted work and the circumvention of a
technological measure in order to gain unauthorized access to the
work, this right to control “access” is not a new one.241 As discussed
earlier, the copyright holder traditionally has controlled and
conditioned access to their works by charging the public for such
access (for example, charging admission to a movie or an art
exhibit).242 In this way, the copyright owner has always had “the
right to control the manner in which members of the public
apprehend the work.”243

238

See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317-18.
240
See 17 U.S.C §§ 1201-1205.
241
See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
242
See supra note 177-78 and accompanying text.
243
Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: the Development of
an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY
(Hugh Hansen ed., 2000).
239
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Scholars such as Jane C. Ginsburg argue that this “access” differs
from the conception of reproduction or communication rights “to the
extent that . . . the user may purchase a digital copy such as a CD
ROM, but the user may not ‘open’ the work to apprehend (listen to
or view) its contents, unless the user acquires the ‘key’ to the
work.”244
Professor Ginsburg argues that this differs from
conventional rights since traditionally, “once a particular copy was
sold, the copyright law did not constrain the purchaser’s further
disposition of that copy.”245 However, the relevance of this fact may
have more to do with the limitations inherent in analog works as
opposed to digital works.246 The differences between the two
formats mandate a re-examination of what rights are required to
maintain a copyright balance.247 Furthermore, even some critics who
claim that the DMCA is overbroad concede that a so-called access
right is necessary to maintain any meaningful exclusive copyright
rights in the digital era.248
Pamela Samuelson argues that § 1201 should have been drafted
more narrowly, punishing only those attempting to circumvent
protections for the purposes of copyright infringement, and not those
circumventing to gain access (as barred by the ban on trafficking).249
However, § 1201 was not designed just to punish individual bad acts,
as the Copyright Act already does, but had the larger goal of keeping
circumvention devices off the market.250 Because the language is
disjunctive, § 1201 also bans devices that are designed, primarily
used, or marketed for use in circumventing a technological measure
that controls access.251 The DMCA was developed to respond to the
244

Id.
Id.
246
See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
247
Ginsburg, supra note 243, at 8 (“[E]ven if an ‘access’ right does not precisely
correspond to either of the traditional copyright rights of reproduction or public
performance, it does respond to what is becoming the dominant way in which works are in
fact exploited in the digital online environment.”).
248
See id. at 9 (“[W]ithout an access right, it is difficult to see how in a digital era
authors can maintain the ‘exclusive Right’ to their ‘Writings’ that the Constitution
authorizes Congress to ‘secure’.”).
249
See Samuelson, supra note 83.
250
See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
251
See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
245
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unprecedented characteristics of the digital environment—
characteristics which demonstrate that once a circumvention device
becomes available on the market, it may be too late to control
widespread copyright infringement.252 Unlike in the analog world,
digital copying can become widespread virtually overnight, acquiring
an instant global audience.253 These unique risks are precisely why
Congress did not make it necessary to prove infringement in order to
stop a circumvention device from becoming available to the
public.254
Additionally, opponents of the anti-circumvention provisions
argue that by barring anyone from designing or marketing a device
that can circumvent an access control measure, and further, not
allowing fair use as a defense to a violation of this ban on trafficking,
§ 1201 effectively extinguishes fair use.255 According to these
critics, if one strictly followed the language of § 1201, it would be
impossible for one who did not possess the technical expertise to
circumvent to legally gain the access necessary to make a fair use of
the work.256
This argument is only persuasive in a futuristic world that
produces exclusively digital copies, since only digital works are
protected by a technological measure. Thus, the term “access,” as
used in § 1201, is only a prerequisite to use to the extent that a nondigital alternative does not exist. While it is certainly an interesting
academic question, it is unsupportable as an underlying premise by
which to advocate the emasculation of § 1201.
Furthermore, the ban on trafficking bars individuals only from
gaining unauthorized access.257 If fair use could be introduced as a
defense against the ban on trafficking, then individuals would be able
to use it as a defense to unlawfully obtaining access. However, even
252

See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
See Lehman Statement, supra note 8.
254
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
255
See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
256
See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussing Nimmer’s hypothetical
analyzing the liability of an individual hired by another individual who lacks the technical
expertise to circumvent a technological measure on his own in order to make a fair use).
257
17 U.S.C. § 1201.
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the traditional notion of fair use has never allowed unauthorized
access.258 Lawful access has always been a prerequisite to fair
use.259
CONCLUSION
Ironically, both the proponents and the critics of the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA rely on the same policy
arguments to advance their positions—that the ultimate goal should
be to allow the public to benefit from the digital dissemination of
copyrighted works.260
Proponents of the DMCA claim that without enacting proper
safeguards for copyright owners, there would be no incentive for
them to risk the increased threats of piracy existing in the digital
world by distributing works digitally.261 Likewise, critics of the
DMCA argue that because § 1201 flatly prohibits circumvention
devices, the public will not have the necessary access to digital
works in order to make fair use of such works.262 Therefore, in a
future where copyrighted works may be available exclusively in
digital format, the public will benefit less from copyrighted works
because access is a prerequisite to fair use, and § 1201 bars access.
However, the latter argument relies entirely on unsupported
assumptions about the future, primarily, that a time will come when
works are exclusively available in digitally encrypted format.263 The
hypothetical scenarios surrounding such a world neglect today’s
realities. Today, as well as in the foreseeable future, it is the
258

See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
See id.
260
Compare Samuelson, supra note 83, with Ginsburg, supra note 19.
261
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
262
See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
263
See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 153-54 (stating the argument that copyright owners
will be able to lock up works of authorship without descramblers assumes “that works will
be available only in encrypted formats. . . . [E]ven where works are susceptible to effective
technological protections, copyright owners may not choose to restrict access to every copy.
Moreover, copies will often still be available for anonymous consultation (and limited
copying) in places such as public libraries (who . . . are entitled to circumvent access and
anti-copying codes, under appropriate circumstances).”).
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copyright owner who is imperiled, not the individual attempting to
make a fair use. Without proper protections there will be no digital
works of which to make a fair use. In this reality, the law must
“reinforce the copyright owner’s efforts to prevent unauthorized (and
unmonitored) copying,”264 as opposed to leaving technology and the
market to what has been dubbed an “encryption arms race.”265

264
265

Id. at 153.
Id.

